ORCP 4L is Oregon’s long-arm statute, conferring jurisdiction to the extent permitted by due process. Tech Heads, Inc. v. Desktop Service Center, Inc., 105 F Supp2d 1142 (D. Or. 2000). Why are the other ORCP 4 section necessary, if there is a catchall provision? The court answered this question in State ex rel. Hydraulic Servocontrols v. Dale, 294 Or 381, 384-85, 657 P2d 211 (1982):
“Subsections B. through K. of Rule 4 may appear to be redundant in view of the subsection L. catchall provision, but they are not superfluous. Based as they are on facts which the United States Supreme Court has held to be adequate bases for jurisdiction, these more specific provisions serve to narrow the inquiry so that if a case falls within one of them, there is no need to litigate more involved issues of due process. Once a plaintiff alleges facts bringing his or her case within a specific provision, that ordinarily will be the end of the matter.” (footnote omitted).
For this reason, the court must first consider whether the case falls within a specific provision of ORCP 4, before determining whether due process permits Oregon to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant under ORCP 4 L. See State ex rel. Michelin v. Wells, 294 Or 296, 299, 657 P2d 207 (1982), abrogated on other grounds, Robinson v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 354 Or 572, 316 P3d 287 (2013); State ex rel. Hydraulic Servocontrols v. Dale, 294 Or at 384. In determining whether specific personal jurisdiction exists in Oregon, the court will look at three factors: “(1) the nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction within Oregon or perform some act by which it purposefully avails itself of privilege of conducting activities in Oregon, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of Oregon law, (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or results from defendant’s Oregon-related activities, and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.” Cross v. Kloster Cruise Lines, Ltd., 897 FSupp 1304, 1310 (D. Or. 1995).